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Abstract: On August 8, 1967, the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
the Philippines, and Thailand met in Bangkok, Thailand and signed a document. 
By virtue of that document, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
was born. Bloc politics of the Cold War made the formation of ASEAN a necessity 
for the nations of the region. It was a step to safeguarding their interests, overcoming 
economic backwardness, and ensuring the continuity of reconciliation by helping 
address the intra-regional tension due to the unresolved territorial disputes. The 
nations in Southeast Asia, by adopting a policy of ‘Look East’ along with a mixed form 
of capitalism (with the government playing a prominent role in the economy) were able 
to enhance their economic growth. By the 1980s, ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand gained reputations as ‘tigers’ for their economic 
dynamism. Despite the economic fallout in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis 
and also the global slowdown as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the economic 
resilience and dynamism of ASEAN is viewed as a potential counterweight to China. 
This paper studied the evolving contours of the ASEAN-India economic relations and 
highlighted how the partnership has grown substantially over the last few decades. 
The paper attempted to examine how this economic engagement is helping build a 
discourse aimed at limiting the impact from the emerging global economic realities; 
where nations distrust global commerce and trade for more nationalist policies. 
The realities of a post COVID-19 period which would be marked by a global slump and 
resource crunch offers further potential to strengthen the ASEAN-India relations. 
Keywords: ASEAN, India, China, South China Sea, Economic Engagement, COVID-19, 
Technology    
The Idea Behind ASEAN
ASEAN was established in 1967 during the peak of the Cold-War. The Association has 
grown from the original five countries-Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand 
and Singapore to include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Myanmar (1997), Laos 
(1997), and Cambodia (1999). 
Southeast Asia was at the centre of Cold War rivalry and the countries felt the 
need to adopt a cooperative approach among each other to ensure that any form 
of expansionist aggression did not occur in the region. By adopting this outlook 
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and through dialogues, members were able to resolve their differences and diffuse 
intra-regional conflicts, such as the ‘Crush Malaysia’ campaign, while preventing new 
ones from arising. Under the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, the formal purpose of the 
Association was to enhance cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, 
and administrative fields, that were deemed to be crucial in promoting regional peace 
and stability. An official commitment to political cooperation was expressed in a 
Declaration of ASEAN concord, while provision for regional order was contained in the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) (Majumdar, 2003).  Through their adherence to 
TAC, peaceful settlements of regional disputes under the principles of non-interference 
and decision making through consensus (also known as the  ‘ASEAN way’) were 
undertaken. This became crucial to manage internal as well as external threats in order 
to ensure a stable political and economic environment in the region (Li, 2016).
According to the National Intelligence Estimate by U.S. Department of State 
issued in 1968, by leaving out the military aspect from the scope of ASEAN, the 
newly formed regional grouping kept its focus on the socio-economic development of 
the region (U.S. Department of State, 1968). The Association was right in doing so, 
since the ASEAN Member States (AMS) did not possess the prowess to undertake 
such a role in the region. By keeping security out of its ambit, ASEAN emphasised 
on improving its economic and cultural relations with the other member states of the 
Association. The partnership was based on equality amongst the members which 
was crucial in realising their interests by overcoming their challenges. 
Figure 1
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and The Philippines: GDP 1961-19981
Note: The graph shows the nominal GDP in percentage of the five original ASEAN countries 
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As shown in Figure 1, the five original ASEAN countries witnessed a high GDP 
growth following the establishment of the Association. A relatively stable regional 
atmosphere made it possible for member states to channel all their resources 
into the goal of nation-building and economic development. Many of the ASEAN 
states, inspired by Japan’s industrialisation of the late 19th century and then its 
rapid recovery following World War II, began adopting a policy of ‘Look East’. The 
adoption of a market-based economy with a heavy hand of the government in most 
of the ASEAN member states in the early years, helped millions improve their 
living standards. In terms of investments, as Southeast Asia provided multinational 
cooperation with low manufacturing costs between 1980 and 1996, the region’s 
share in terms of global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) rose from 6.7% to 14.7%. 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
Report (1997), out of the USD 256 billion global FDI in to the developing countries, 
USD 90 billion went to Southeast Asia. Thus, FDI in ASEAN increased by over six-
fold since 1980 and by two-thirds since 1990 (Bartels & Mirza, 2005).
In January 1992, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) was signed which 
enabled GDP growth of over 6 to 10% for most of the ASEAN states, as shown in 
Figure 1. This made Southeast Asia one of the most attractive markets for investors 
for its low cost and high production capabilities, until the Asian monetary crisis 
hit the region in 1997. As shown in Figure 1, the ASEAN states had to face the 
onslaught of the financial crisis that had a ripple effect across the region, with 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, witnessing a GDP 
of -13.1%, -7.3%, -2.2%, -7.6%, and -0.5% respectively.
The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997 lead to a long and difficult recovery 
for the ASEAN states which now included its new members along with the original 
five countries. The AFC more than anything shook Southeast Asia’s confidence in 
open trade and financial globalisation. Paul Krugman in a paper titled “The Myth 
of Asia’s Miracle” published in Foreign Affairs (1994), wrote that the increase in 
labour inputs was mainly responsible for the high growth rate in Southeast Asia. 
However, this growth was not accompanied with the technological development 
needed for a sustained growth trajectory. According to Krugman, the economic 
progress of Southeast Asia in the 1980s was very similar to the one experienced 
by most Eastern European countries, which also faced collapse at the end of the 
1980s (Krugman, 1994). 
It was argued that growth in the absence of any fundamental increase in its labour 
productivity, contributed to the fragility of the markets in Southeast Asia which could 
not withstand the shock of the financial crisis (Nam, 2005). Further, international 
bodies such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, by enforcing the rules of globalisation resulting 
in the liberalisation of the financial markets, put an end to many restrictions that 
formerly regulated the flow of capital into and out of Southeast Asian States. On 
the positive side, these policies  led to double digit growth and an increase in trade 
in many of the ASEAN states along with growth in the number of joint ventures 
and foreign-financed enterprises. However, this also made their economies more 




ASEAN Member States GDP 1999-20192
Note: The graph shows the nominal GDP of all the ten ASEAN States in % from 
1999-2019. 
The graph in Figure 2 indicates the GDP of the ASEAN member states in the 
post-AFC period. The AFC of 1997 had a major economic fallout in the ASEAN 
countries by halting the entire growth momentum of the region. And while most of 
the ASEAN states were able to make some recovery, the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis of 2008 that led to a decline in global demand impacting trade and 
commerce, fuelled a further decline in growth across the region. To a significant 
degree, the two financial crises put many of the ASEAN states into a slower 
growth trajectory, which persists till today.  
In seeking deeper cooperation towards addressing the slowdown of economic 
growth being witnessed by some of the AMS there are also other internal and 
external challenges. In terms of the internal challenges, the intra-ASEAN disputes 
and disagreements over issues such as unsettled territorial disputes amongst 
some of its member states is the Achilles heel for the Association.  This ongoing 
discord over territorial claims has led to the adoption of policies by the individual 
ASEAN states contrary to the broad agenda of the Association. This is not only 
impacting the unity but also causes a lack of unanimity for the passage of any 
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member states. The result is also being felt on the process of establishing an 
ASEAN economic community and its union, which would enable regional stability 
and security (Dibb, 2001). Apart from the internal challenges, today ASEAN is 
also facing a changing external environment with a stronger China which has 
become more assertive in the region. This is coupled with the region being at the 
centre of the emerging geo-political environment, which is shaping the future role 
of ASEAN. 
China’s Emergence and the Changing Role of ASEAN
The economic slowdown in the post-AFC period not only highlighted the limits of 
globalisation but also ASEAN’s own internal weaknesses as an institution. The 
post-AFC and the start of the 21st century witnessed the emergence of China. 
Due its continuous hyper economic growth throughout the 1990s, it was able to 
widen the economic gap with the rest of Southeast Asia. It also subsequently 
helped China build its military advantage over ASEAN. China’s Grand Strategy, 
which is based on the narrative termed  the ‘China Dream’ is being aggressively 
floated today. The intent of this grand strategy is to develop China into an 
economically prosperous nation, with a military that is capable of safeguarding 
national sovereignty along with the interests of Beijing far beyond the mainland. 
China’s definition of national sovereignty and territorial integrity is not limited to 
the defence of the mainland against attack. It is also being applied more widely to 
include the need for maritime expansion to secure its seas (Wanli, 2011). 
China has numerous territorial claims, however, the need to have a stable 
neighbourhood has made it settle or defer most of its land-border disputes.  While 
deferring its land-territorial claims, China has become more adamant, impatient, 
and rowdy over its maritime-territorial claims (Gompert, 2013). Much of China’s 
economic success can be attributed to the operations of multinational companies 
that import components from Asia, assemble goods using Chinese workers, and 
export the finished products to markets in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere. One 
of the consequences of this was the increase in the demand for energy in order 
to fuel its manufacturing sector which became a major pillar for China’s economic 
modernisation (Saunders, 2010). 
Until 1993, China was not concerned so much about energy security as it was 
an exporter of energy resources. However, the rapid economic modernisation 
and growth that witnessed a spike in demand in the 1990s along with a stagnant 
domestic supply, saw China transforming from a net exporter to a net importer 
of energy resources. Further, as a latecomer to the international energy markets 
as well as China’s physical distance, and the presence of western oil companies 
in every resource rich region, made it difficult to gain a secured possession over 
oil and gas fields (Panwar, 2009). This factored into China’s maritime expansion 
in the disputed South China Sea (SCS), where it became more assertive over its 
claims causing an imbalance to the regional order as being witnessed today.
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China is already asserting itself militarily through the deployment of its naval 
forces at strategic locations in the SCS. This military posturing is being used 
to reinforce its claims to the disputed islands and reefs in the SCS. The 
need to assert its claims in the SCS through its military presence emerges 
from China’s dependence on maritime trade which is crucial for its commercial 
interests (Duo, 2012). 
The situation in the SCS continues to remain tense with China increasing its 
assertiveness over the disputed islands and reefs. China has increased its 
military presence in the region and in particular its naval build-up along with the 
construction of artificial islands by increasing the area of landfills around the 
existing islands and reefs. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, in 2015 reported that the 
Chinese infrastructures developed in the disputed sites were explicitly military 
in nature. Satellite images indicate that these artificial islands have helipads, 
airstrips, harbours, and facilities to support large numbers of troops. According to 
U.S. officials, China seeks to establish an Air Defence Identification Zone [ADIZ] 
through the new infrastructure that would be used to enhance radar coverage 
of the area, support a small presence of military personnel, and provide logistic 
support for ships patrolling the farther reaches of the SCS (Page & Barnes, 2015). 
While China and ASEAN are working towards finalising a draft Code of Conduct 
(COC) for the SCS, differences on its modality remain.  Over the last few years the 
ongoing dispute between China and the ASEAN states, that have maritime claims 
and rights over the resources in the SCS, have escalated. The AMS are wary of 
any form of conflict in the SCS as it may impact the sea lines of communication 
throughout East and Southeast Asia (Majumdar, 2003). 
China’s repeated intrusions into the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the 
other parties are challenging the existing status quo and undermining the security 
and stability in the region. China’s assertion in the disputed waters through the 
deployment of its naval crafts and other illicit activities being carried out, has been 
possible due to its increasing economic power. However, the changing internal and 
external environment could pose some challenge to its economic growth which has 
be crucial in fuelling Beijing’s outreach.  
Factors Limiting China’s Momentum
The Economic Fallout of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis
At the turn of the 21st century, China emerged as a major economic power by 
adopting an aggressive mercantilist trade policy and currency intervention 
undertaken by its government, which helped make its exports more competitive 
compared to its competitors. While China’s accession into the WTO in 2001 led 
to it adopting a more liberal trade policy it was done so in order to gain further 
access to the large Western markets (Blumenthal, 2007). As a consequence, 
its dependence on foreign trade as a driver of its economy increased sharply, 
with the ratio of total imports and exports to GDP of 43.8% in 2000 increasing 
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to 63.9% in 2005 (Jianwu, Shantong & Polaski, 2007). China being an export 
driven economy has continued to witness a decline in its GDP which is attributed to 
the changing external as well as internal environment.  
One of the major impacts of the 2008 global financial crisis was a sharp decline 
in global demand resulting in the contraction of trade and commerce. China’s 
exports fell by as much as 20% in early 2009, and since its economy is highly 
dependent on foreign trade, with 40% of its GDP being driven by exports, it had 
an impact on its economic growth. When foreign demand dropped sharply, a 
large number of factories located in the southeast of China, who were mainly 
exports-oriented, closed down. The same period also saw a fall in China’s 
foreign investments. In the first half of 2009, FDI into China decreased by 17.9% 
according to the 2009 World Investment Report issued by the UNCTAD. This 
was the first time in 30 years that China’s FDI receipts dropped dramatically 
(Sun & Fu, 2012). Prior to the financial crisis, China witnessed a sustained 
double-digit GDP growth rate reaching a high of 14.2% in 2007. The crisis had 
an adverse impact on China’s economic growth with its GDP declining to 9.6% 
in 2008 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008). 
China’s Emerging Debt-Crisis 
Internally, there is the growing debt to GDP crisis which China is currently 
facing. In order to limit the negative impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, 
China launched a major investment programme in the second half of 2008 and 
2009, which saw credit expansion and large-scale investment in real estate 
and infrastructure. The results of China’s stimulus programme were impressive, 
making China the first globally significant economy to begin to recover from 
the global economic recession. As the stimulus package began to take hold, 
China’s growth accelerated significantly, to 9.5 and 11.4%, respectively, in the 
first and second quarters of 2009 (Lardy, 2012). This expansionary fiscal policy 
approved by the People’s Congress in 2009, led to a total government deficit of 
950 billion Yuan (US $ 139 billion), the highest in six decades (Sun & Fu, 2012). 
According to a report by McKinsey Global Institute, China’s debt has 
quadrupled since 2007, rising to USD 28 trillion by mid-2014, from USD 7 trillion 
in 2007. At 282% of GDP, China’s debt is larger than that of the United States 
or Germany (Dobbs, Lund, Woetzel & Mutafchieva, 2015). According to some 
estimates, China’s total debt hit 237% of GDP at the end of the first quarter 
of 2016 (Wildau & Mitchell, 2016). According to the Institute of International 
Finance, China’s debt-to-GDP ratio rose 11 percentage points in 2019 to 310%, 
and rose a further 7 percentage points in the first quarter of 2020 to reach 
317% (China’s Debt to GDP Ratio Surges, 2020). The IMF has warned China 
on the risk of its growing debt burden, and urged more aggressive action to curb 
its credit growth. There is the possibility of high-risk spill-overs to the broader 
global economy if its debt burden, due to its excessive credit, is not contained 
(Wildau & Mitchell, 2016).
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The Unfavourable Demographic Profile   
The evolving issue of an unfavourable demographic profile that China would witness 
in the future because of its ‘one child policy’ is another factor. From 1980 to 2000, 
the average annual growth rate for the total population was about 1.3%, while the 
working-age population grew at an average of over 2% (Jianwu, Shantong & Polaski, 
2007). Realising the impending demographic challenge, the 5th Plenary Session of 
the 18th Chinese Party of China Central Committee (November 2015), recommended 
expansion of the policy to two children per couple. According to a 2015 World Bank 
report, China’s working age population is expected to decline, and labour’s contribution 
to growth will turn negative.  This would also lead to an ageing population which would 
cause a shortage of not only human resource but also a fall in the rate of savings which 
in turn would cause a fall in China’s capital formation (World Bank, 2015). 
Withdrawal of Foreign Corporation from China
Another factor impacting China’s growth today is the outflow of foreign companies 
with their manufacturing bases in China to other countries in Southeast Asia. One of 
the reasons for this is due to the minimum wage levels in China which have been 
increasing steadily over the last decade.  Driven by rapid economic growth, declining 
population growth, and with workers becoming better organised, employers in 
many sectors were forced to pay higher wages in order to recruit and retain staff. 
Further, in March 2004, Minimum Wage Regulations were implemented by the 
then Ministry of Labour and Social Security which established a comprehensive 
framework for calculating and adjusting the minimum wage. The new regulations 
took into consideration the minimum living costs of local employees and their 
dependents, consumer price index for urban residents, social security and housing 
fund contributions paid by individual employees, the level of economic development, 
and the supply and demand of labour in the locality (China Labour Bulletin, 2019). 
Based on these new regulations, there has been a substantial increase in the 
level of China’s minimum monthly wages. This has made China less attractive to 
foreign investors today who, in the past, ventured into China to secure business 
contracts in order to take advantage of its low-cost labour and increase their profit 
margins. The rise of labour costs in China’s manufacturing sector has thus, led to 
foreign manufacturers moving away from China into other low labour cost nations in 
Southeast Asia such as Cambodia and Vietnam (Ao, 2019). 
The COVID-19 pandemic and the uncertain outcome of China’s ongoing trade 
tension with the U.S. is further affecting its growth. For the first quarter of 2020, due 
to the COVID-19 outbreak, China’s economy posted its first contraction in decades, 
falling to -6.8% according to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (Huimin 
& Nian, 2020). And while China’s economy witnessed a modest growth of 3.2% in 
the second quarter of 2020, its growth for the remaining quarters for this year would 
depend on the recovery in the West and its bilateral trade with ASEAN, which over 
the years has increased dramatically (Wenbo & Nian, 2020).    
47Counterweight to China?
Foreign Policy Review
The disruptions to the supply chains due to the pandemic and the trade war with 
the U.S. is making foreign companies re-assess their long-term strategy in China. 
Today, major foreign corporations that include Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs) of automobiles and computers, are shifting their plants out of China into 
other countries in the region. Other Asian countries, including ASEAN member 
states, have stepped up efforts to attract foreign investments by targeting companies 
that are rethinking their supply chains in the wake of the disruption caused to the 
supply chain across China (Jibiki, 2020). 
These factors have impacted China’s growth as indicated in figure 3 where its 
GDP, from a high of 10.6% in 2010, has continued to decline. In 2016, its GDP fell 
below 7% for the first time since at least the early 1990s after its economic reform 
was launched in 1978.
 
Figure 33
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Note: The graph shows China’s nominal GDP growth in percentage, between 2010 
to 2019.  
The Changing Role of ASEAN
According to Chapter one, Article one of the ASEAN Charter, the primary purpose of 
the association is to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further 
strengthen peace-oriented values in the region (ASEAN, 2008).  The emerging 
traditional and non-traditional security challenges in the 21st century along with an 








security community in order to help bring conflict resolution and reduce the threat 
or use of force (Weatherbee, 2013). ASEAN has begun to seek a multilateral 
approach towards building partnerships in order to reduce the increasing tensions 
in the region. The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia 
Summit, and the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus, indicate emerging 
security challenges that are impacting the regional stability (Dibb, 2001).
With the evolving discourse on security expanding in scope and becoming more 
complex, economic necessity remains crucial in building any new partnership. 
China’s illicit activities, particularly in the SCS, remain far from benign, in fact, 
they seem to be escalating. China, by stepping up its activity in the disputed 
SCS during the pandemic, has offset the gains of its economic regionalism 
that spurred growth especially in the less-developed ASEAN states. At the 36th 
ASEAN Summit held on June 26, 2020, while not specifically mentioning China, 
the Chairman’s Statement clearly raised concerns about the ongoing activities 
in the SCS that include land reclamation activities and serious incidents which, 
as expressed, have eroded trust and confidence and could undermine peace, 
security, and stability in the region. The statement emphasised the importance 
of non-militarisation and self-restraint in the conduct of all activities by claimants 
and all other states, including those mentioned in the Declaration of Conduct 
(DOC) that could further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in the 
SCS (Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit, 2020). 
While China agreed with ASEAN for peaceful negotiations through the 2002 
DOC, nonetheless, by constantly engaging its naval power to assert its claims, 
today China is witnessing pushback from ASEAN and its member states that are 
not willing to be undermined despite the prevailing power asymmetry. As a result, 
ASEAN is beginning to incorporate security as part of its mandate to ensure stability 
in the region which is crucial for promoting trade and commerce. 
India is also concerned about the growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indian 
Ocean region along with the transgression on its land borders. In an effort to 
address security challenges through partnership, India and ASEAN signed 
a Strategic partnership in 2012 which was a natural progression given their 
deep historical and cultural ties. Further, no direct conflicts exist pertaining to 
territorial disputes between India and ASEAN countries and both sides share the 
principle of non-interventionism in the affairs of the other states. Uncertainties 
brought about by the financial crises of the past to the retreat being witnessed 
in the existing multilateral trading order, and now the pandemic, have opened 
opportunities for India and ASEAN to further build their economic cooperation.
ASEAN-India Economic Engagement
India and ASEAN began to rapidly expand their economic relations in the post-Cold 
War period. India’s ‘Look East’ policy in 1991 focused on expanding relations with 
ASEAN, with economics at its core. This new diplomatic outreach provided dividend 
as India’s two-way trade with ASEAN more than doubled to USD 6 billion from 
1992 to 1996, and crossed USD 10 billion in the year 2002 (Jha, 2010). India and 
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ASEAN signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) 
on October 8, 2003, in Bali, Indonesia, to institutionalise a framework for future 
economic cooperation (EXIM Bank India, 2018). India also began building 
bilateral economic relations with the individual AMS such as implementing the 
Early Harvest Scheme (EHS) with Thailand on September 1, 2004, and the CECA 
with Singapore and Malaysia in August 2005 and July 2011 respectively.
Figure 44
The graph shows India’s Export, Import, and Total trade with ASEAN 
in USD million, between 1996 to 2019 
Note: The graph shows India’s Export, Import, and Total trade with ASEAN in USD 
million, between 1996 to 2019
The graph shows India’s Export, Import, and Total trade with ASEAN in USD 
million, between 1996 to 2019 The graph in figure 4 indicates the bilateral trade 
between India and ASEAN which has been increasing over the last two decades. 
India was seen as an important partner for ASEAN to help circumvent the economic 
slowdown in the post- 2008 financial crisis period which was marked by a major 
decline in global trade and commerce. The two signed the India-ASEAN Trade in 
Goods Agreement in September 2009 which came into effect in January 2010 and 
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into effect on July 1, 2015. The signing of these agreements has had a positive 
impact on the economic engagement with total trade increasing sharply since 2010, 
as indicated in figure 4. India-ASEAN trade was USD 86.86 billion in 2019 and it 
is estimated to reach USD 300 billion by 2025 (India-ASEAN bilateral trade may 
double by 2025 to USD 300 billion: Study, 2019).
The ASEAN-India FTA provided Indian industries and exporters opportunities to 
expand operations and explore other areas of investment in the ASEAN markets. 
A significant proportion of Indian global outward FDI (OFDI) stock is in ASEAN, 
which remains a major investment destination for Indian companies. A majority of 
Indian OFDI go to service sector industries, primarily in banking and finance, IT and 
IT-enabled services (ITeS). Indian manufacturing OFDI in ASEAN is significant in 
metal and transport equipment industries. According to a joint ASEAN-UNCTAD 
Investment Report published in 2017, Indian manufacturing investments are 
about 32% of the OFDI concentrated in technology-intensive industries and 
during 2005−2015, the medium-technology industry, namely basic metals and 
fabricated metal products, accounted for the largest share, followed by the high-
technology industry such as motor vehicles and other transport equipment with a 
34.3% share. These two industries received about 72% of Indian manufacturing 
OFDI flows to the region. In addition, Indian investment in pharmaceuticals has 
grown rapidly in recent years, particularly in 2015. Indian investment activities 
in services in ASEAN have expanded rapidly during 2005−2015 and were 62% 
of the total Indian OFDI. The bulk of these investments went to communication 
services, followed by construction, and transportation and storage. Professional 
services, scientific and technical activities, and IT and ITeS services are also 
significant and growing. ASEAN is also a major source of FDI to India with a 
total investment of USD 45 billion in cumulative FDI equity capital during 2010–
2015, which represented 16% of FDI flows in India. Singapore accounted for 
the lion’s share of FDI into India. Most of the ASEAN companies are involved in 
India’s infrastructure development and other services industries. As is evident, 
the bilateral investment relationship between ASEAN and India is growing stronger 
(UNCTAD, 2017).
India’s economic engagement with ASEAN over the last two decades has 
increased substantially. However, in terms of trade, there is emerging asymmetry. 
While India’s exports to ASEAN have been increasing, its imports have witnessed 
a much higher jump, leading to an increasing trade deficit. In order to address 
the increasing trade asymmetry and establish a more balanced trade, during the 
16th ASEAN Economic Ministers-India Consultation, held on September 10, 2019, 
in Bangkok, both sides reached an agreement to review the existing Free Trade 
Area (FTA). In a written reply to the Upper House of the India Parliament (Rajya 
Sabha) on November 29, 2019, the Commerce and Industry Minister of India, 
Piyush Goyal, stated that the proposed scope of the review of the ASEAN-India 
FTA could include: implementation issues, rules of origin; verification process and 
release of consignments; customs procedures; would consider negotiations on 
further liberalisation of trade in goods; and sharing and exchange of trade data 
(India-ASEAN FTA review, 2019).
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The India-ASEAN Partnership 
in a Changing Global Economic Environment
 
Security challenges in the past two decades has ushered the need for ASEAN to build 
a new narrative for multilateral partnerships. China has emerged as ASEAN’s largest 
trading partner after their FTA came into effect in 2010, nonetheless, its increasing 
assertiveness, particularly in the SCS, remains a concern. The AMS are today 
attempting to find the right balance between engagement and containment of China 
(Mohan, 1995). The AFC altered the power symmetry between China and ASEAN 
in favour of the former. However, the consequences of the global financial crisis 
of 2008, the ongoing trade tension with the U.S. along with the internal changes 
taking place in China have eroded some of its growth momentum resulting in 
a mixed outcome. China has been able to consolidate its economic leadership 
amongst some of the ASEAN countries by pushing economic regionalism through 
the Greater Mekong Subregion initiatives. ASEAN states on the other hand, by 
taking advantage of the changing economic environment along with their own rapid 
economic growth, are emerging as China’s competitors in certain sectors such as 
manufacturing. Some of the ASEAN countries, by developing their manufacturing 
capacities and capabilities, have integrated and are part of the Global Value 
Chain (GVC).  Further, by offering low-cost manufacturing alternatives they are 
becoming a strong competitor and a viable option to the various multinational 
companies that are looking to move out of China. 
The global economy has still not fully recovered from the economic fallout of the 
2008 financial crisis which has had an impact on global trade and commerce. This 
global slowdown has also resulted in the increasing resistance to the global liberal 
economic order with restrictions on the free flow of trade. This has led to a call for 
greater multilateral cooperation and dialogue amongst institutions and countries. 
In the midst of these challenges, the world is also witnessing an unprecedented 
health crisis with major economic implications.
India and the ASEAN countries are facing the onslaught of the pandemic with 
their growth projections being downgraded for the current fiscal year. The Asian 
Development Bank has estimated the growth for Southeast Asia to decelerate 
to 1.0% in 2020 on account of COVID-19 (Asian Development Bank, 2020). As 
the outbreak spread, it has impacted the economies of Southeast Asia which are 
centred mainly on tourism and export-oriented industries. The imposition of travel 
restrictions has impacted the tourism sector and the disruption of supply chains and 
temporary shutting of plants is affecting the ASEAN economies that rely on export-
led growth (Ao, 2020). 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in May 2020, projected that India’s GDP growth 
on account of the COVID-19 during 2020-21 is likely to remain in negative territory. 
The World Bank projected India’s economy to shrink by 3.2% in the current fiscal 
year while international rating agencies like Moody’s Investors Service, Fitch 
Rating and S&P Global Ratings have all predicted a 4-5% contraction (Indian 
economy to contract, 2020). In this emerging scenario, ASEAN and India would 
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be crucial partners for a post-COVID-19 economic recovery through greater intra-
regional trade. India and ASEAN need to further build their partnership and look 
at the crisis for the opportunities it presents. COVID-19 has revealed major flaws 
in the existing supply chains such as single-source dependencies which 
led to production and supply across the globe coming to a halt (Cordon & 
Buatois, 2020). Experiences from the outbreak of the pandemic are pushing 
foreign companies, including OEMs, to move towards establishing flexible 
and adaptable supply chains. This move towards  more flexible and multi-level 
sourcing provides an opportunity for India and ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia, 
that are looking to enhance their manufacturing sector and participation in the GVC 
(Making India an Alternative Supply to China, 2020). As mentioned earlier, some of 
the ASEAN countries are already well integrated and have one of the highest GVC 
participation indices in the world, and would be an ideal partner for India (EXIM Bank 
India, 2018). 
While many of the global corporations are reworking their long-term strategies 
and looking to withdraw from China, there is also a sharp decrease in foreign 
investment into emerging Asian economies. On account of the pandemic, foreign 
investors today are looking to invest closer to home for sourcing. Further, with 
falling demand and disrupted supply chains, many multinational enterprises 
have already slowed their capital expenditure in the wake of declining profits. 
This results in lower reinvested earnings and, as a consequence, is leading to a 
decline in the FDI inflows being witnessed in all the emerging economies in Asia. 
However, this would be a short-term hurdle. In the long-term, supply chains will 
continue to evolve and re-invent through the adoption of new technologies and 
thus, would be dependent on pricing irrespective of the distance of the supply 
source (Thapar, 2020).  
Many of the ASEAN countries have already been offering incentives for new 
companies to move factories from China in light of the U.S.-China trade war. For 
instance, Indonesia plans to set up 19 industrial parks by 2024. It is also cutting the 
corporate tax rate to 22% from 25% this year, then to 20% in 2022, a year earlier 
than it had previously planned. Malaysia, as part of its economic package announced 
in June, offered a 15-year tax exemption for manufacturers that are willing to invest 
500 million Ringgit (USD 117 million) into the country (Jibiki, 2020). India has also 
been promoting the development of its domestic manufacturing sector as part of 
its ‘Make in India’ initiative and, as mentioned earlier, is keen to get integrated into 
the GVC. Over the last few years, India has undertaken reforms that resulted in the 
deregulation of FDI rules for several sectors. In 2019, India was amongst the top 
ten countries in terms of attracting foreign funds into a variety of sectors including 
services, technology, IT and telecom, and construction.  The role of FDI for India 
and ASEAN countries cannot be overstated since it brings the capital that helps in 
the upgrading of supply chains and removes inefficiencies. Further, foreign capital 
also brings the technologies and experience that helps build not only the capacity 
but also the capabilities in the region (Bhasin, 2020). The enhanced capabilities along 
with a deeper partnership between India and ASEAN has the potential to become a 
growth engine which would be crucial in fuelling the global economic recovery in 




While the actual economic cost of the COVID-19 pandemic is yet to be measured, it 
has already caused major disruption to the flow of trade and commerce (including 
tourism) and impacted economies and livelihoods across the globe. The economic 
fallout from COVID-19 would be a major challenge marked by a further decline 
in global demand in the post-pandemic period. The economic recovery process 
would also be shaped by a global environment where there would be the further 
resurgence of the antithesis to globalisation. This new environment, with a weaker 
economic system and marked by increasing mercantilism tendencies being adopted 
by some countries, will put stress on the economic health and make the recovery a 
long and uphill challenge.  
The economic growth and resilience that India and the ASEAN states has 
showcased over the last decades has enabled them to become a part of the 
global economic machinery and today they are being invited to take part at the 
high table of premiere economic arrangements. While both have witnessed 
economic slowdowns in the past, their resilience has made them emerge stronger 
by adapting and building new partnerships. In the advent of COVID-19 and the 
economic uncertainties of the trade war with the U.S., global corporations are 
moving out of China and looking to relocate. India and ASEAN are viable options 
with their favourable demographics, massive consumption, and their adaptability 
to new technologies which enable production efficiency while being cost effective. 
COVID-19 has altered the world permanently and it has also impacted the way 
businesses will be carried out in the future. In this changing economic environment, 
technology, which includes automation and digitalisation, will become even more 
crucial. India and ASEAN need to accelerate their economic partnership through 
greater intra-regional trade. Further, this partnership needs to become more agile 
by deepening cooperation in the technology sector.  The ‘Make in India’ initiative 
while looking to enhance India’s domestic manufacturing capabilities, also 
provides a platform to build partnerships. The India-ASEAN partnership, through 
co-production and co-development, would enhance production capabilities, which 
are required in a changing global economic environment. As the future of global 
trade and commerce will be technology driven, innovations and capacity building 
will be fundamental in establishing the India-ASEAN partnership as an alternative 
to the pre-existing driver of global growth. 
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